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CONTRACTIONS AND REVISIONS OF 
KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The theory of nonmonotonic reasoning and the theory of belief revision 
share a very important subject. Both theories help to understand how 
it is possible rationally to pass from one knowledge system into 
another knowledge system that is in contradiction with the former 
one. In nonmonotonic reasoning this transition is accomplished by 
distinguishing between axioms (“explicit beliefs”) and theorems 
(“implicit beliefs”) and giving up the doctrine that more axioms must 
always yield more theorems. Thus my old (implicit) belief that Tweety 
can fly may well turn into disbelief after getting the information 
(acquiring the explicit belief) that Tweety is a penguin. A considerable 
limitation of this approach is that the new axiom must be (monotoni- 
cally) consistent with the previous axioms, or else WC get an incon- 
sistent knowledge base. 
The theory of belief revision on which I shall focus my attention is 
not subject to this restriction. In fact, it does not at all distinguish 
between axioms and theorems, or between beliefs and their reasons. 
The knowledge systems it takes into consideration are i&o/e theories, 
where a theory, or knowledge set, is understood as a set of sentences 
closed under some appropriate logic Cn. We shall assume that this 
logic includes classical propositional logic, that it is compact (i.e., if 
A E Cn(lM) then A E Cn(M,,) for some finite Iu0 E M) and that it 
satisfies disjunction of premises (i.e., if C E Cn(M u {A}) and C E 
Cn(lM u {B}), then C E Cn(M u {A v B))). As a consequence of 
this, we have the deduction theorem for our logic (if B E Cn(M u {A)) 
then A + B E Cn(M)). Finally we shall presuppose that the logic is 
monotonic (if A E Cn(lw) then A E Cn(lW u {Bj)). Our language is 
to include the usual propositional operators --J, &, v , +, and et, 
and the propositional constants T (“Truth”) and I (“Falsity”). The 
set of all sentences of the language is denoted by L, the set of all 
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logical theorems {A: A E Cn(QI)} ’ d IS enoted by LT. M E L is called 
consistent if L 4 Cn(M). We frequently write M k A for A E Cn(M). 
Throughout this paper, variables A, B, C etc. range over arbitrary 
sentences, and variables M, N, M’, N’, M” etc. range over arbitrary 
sets of sentences. 
How can such a holistic theory of belief revision handle inconsist- 
ent theories? I believe that Twcety can fly. What should I do if I 
come to know that Twcety in fact does not fly? As a first answer, I 
may be content with the advice that I first have to withdraw my belief 
that Tweety can fly, then add the belief that Twccty cannot and 
finally take the deductive closure. (This advice has become known as 
the hvi idenfiry.) A moment’s reflection shows that the real problems 
are not solved by this move. How are contractions to be accomplished? 
Peter Glrdenfors founded and developed, partly in collaboration with 
David Makinson and Carlos Alchourron, the approach I am going to 
sketch now. At the end of the 1970s he started by specifying a set of 
“rationality postulates” or constraints that must be satisfied by oper- 
ations on a knowledge set in order to model the intuitive process of 
knowledge contraction. Let K be a knowledge set and :K bc a func- 
tion from L to 2’-. We write K L A for Lo. Then :K is a contrac- 
tion function over K if and only if it satisfies the following postulates: 
(Cl) K A A is a knowledge set (closure) 
w KlAcK (inclusion) 
(C3) if A 4 K then K I A = K (vacuity) 
(C4) iftiAthenA$KL A (success) 
(f-3 K E Cn((K L A) u (A}) (recovery) 
(C6) if t A ct B then K 2 A = K 2 B (preservation) 
(C7) K L A n K A B E K - A & B (conjunction 1) 
(C8) if A $ K - A 8c B then 
K-A&BsK-A (conjunction 2) 
For the motivation of these constraints for contractions see [4], 
Chapter 3, [5], and 171. (Cl)-(C8) make sure, among other things, that 
contractions do not incur unnecessary loss of information.’ As we will 
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almost exclusively be concerned with the formal aspects of the 
dynamics of knowledge systems in the following, some familiarity 
with the literature cited is useful for the reader. 
Even if we dispose of a reasonable set of postulates for contrac- 
tions, this will not help us in actually performing any contraction or 
revision of our current knowledge system. What we need is a method 
of constrz~rinl: a new state of knowledge out of the earlier enc. We 
require some structure here to guide us which in a way corresponds 
to the information contained in the distinction between explicit and 
implicit beliefs in nonmonotonic reasoning. or in the storage of the 
justifications for our beliefs in reason maintenance systems. In this 
paper I shall briefly review two different methods of knowledge con- 
traction that were suggested in the course of the Gardenforsian 
research program. Then a tight connection between these methods 
will be established showing that they even can be viewed as cquiv- 
alent. I close with some remarks on simple and iterated revisions. 
2. TWO ORDERINGS FOR CONTRACTION CONSTRUCTJOTS 
The first method I want to discuss is investigated in Alchourron, 
Glrdenfors and Makinson [2] and may be called the method of I&I- 
tionalparrial meet contractions. When trying to exclude A from K 
while minimizing the loss of information, it is tempting to take a 
maximal subset of K that does not imply A. Let M(K, A) be the set 
of all such subsets. AIchourron and -Makinson [l] showed, howcvcr. 
that the choice of an element of M(K. A) will in gcncral leave far too 
many sentences untouched. Conversely. they proved that the full meet 
fl M(K, A) cancels far too many sentences from K. A natural idea is 
to consider the pmtiuf meet of some prejkred clcmcnts of M(K, A). 
Provided that we have a preference relation on M(K), where 
M(K) = U {M(K, A): I! A],’ we can obtain reasonable contractions: 
DEFINITION I. If d is a preference relation on M(K) then the 
associated contraction function - = C( <) over K is given by 
i 
0 (ME M(K, A): M’ < M 
KAA = for all M’ E M(K, A)}, if tc Al 
K ifl- A. 
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If L is a contraction function over K and there is a (transitive) 
preference relation < on M(K) such that - = C( <), then I is 
called a (transitively) relational partial meet contraction function 
((T) RPMCF). 
Note that M(K, A) = @ if and only if A E LT. Now, what properties 
should we require for 6‘~ Alchourrbn, Gardenfors and Makinson [2] 
make use of only two postulates: 
PO) If M(K, A) # 0 then there is an M E M(K, A) such 
that M’ < M for all M’ E M(K, A) (existence) 
PI) if M < M’ and M’ < M” then M Q M” (transitivity) 
Only relations < satisfying (PO) are intended to quality as pwference 
relations (P-relations).3 The authors show that C( &) satisfies (Cl)- 
(C8) if < satisfies (PO) and (PI). Conversely, they prove a represen- 
tation theorem: Any contraction function - over K satisfying (Cl)- 
(C8) is a TRPMCF. In the proof, a preference relation < = P*( 2) 
is constructed from a given contraction function - over K, and it is 
shown that C(P*( -)) = A. We put off the discussion of P*( -) 
until the end of Section 4. 
A second method of constructing contractions, the method of 
epistemic entrenchment contractions, is found for the first time in 
Gardenfors [4], Section 4.8, and presented more elegantly in Glrden- 
fors and Makinson [5]. Some relation over the sentences in a knowl- 
edge set is supposed to exist that reflects how deeply entrenched these 
sentences are in our current state of knowledge. Provided that we 
have a relation of epistemic entrenchment on L, then, Gardenfors and 
Makinson recommend that it should guide us in performing knowl- 
edge contractions as follows: 
DEFINITION 2. If I is a relation of epistemic entrenchment on L 
then the associated contraction function - = C(I) over K is given 
by 
K-A = 
K n {B: A < A v B}, if VA, 
K, iftA. 
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If - is a contraction function over K and there is a relation of 
epistemic entrenchment I on L such that - = C(I), then L is 
called an epistemic entrenchment contraction function (EECF). 
There should be no danger of confusion of this ‘C’ with the ‘C’ of 
Definition 1 if the difTerent arguments arc carefully kept apart. 
A < A v BofcoursestandsforA I A v BandnotA v B I A. 
We ought to say what features make a relation on L count as a rela- 
tion of epistemic entrenchment (EE-relation). In [5] we find the follow- 
ing collection of postulates: 
(El) 
(W 
(E3) 
(W 
(E5) 
if A I B and B I C then A I C (transitivity) 
AlBorBIA (connectivity) 
if A k B then A < B (dominance) 
AsA&BorBsA&B (conjunctiveness) 
if K # L, then A I B for all B iff A 4 K 
(minimality) 
w if B I A for all B then A E LT (maximality) 
Note that (E2), following from (El), (E3) and (E4), is redundant. 
Nevertheless it is expedient to have it as a principle of its own. For 
example, (E2) immediately entails that I is reflexive. Since K appears 
in (E5), we call I an EE-relation with respect to K. For the intuitive 
motivation of these postulates, see [3], [4], [q. 
The content of Definition 2 is not easy to grasp. But it receives an 
excellent justification from its interplay with the (re-)construction of 
EE-orderings out of the contraction behaviour. 
DEFINITION 3. If - is a contraction function over K then the 
associated relation of epistemic entrenchment I = E( -) on L is 
given by 
A I BifandonlyifA$KL A&BortA&B. 
This definition is very plausible. If you give up A & B by retracting A 
then A could not have been more firmly entrenched than B. 
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6 satisfying (pd)-(Pit 
. 
Scheme I 
In Glrdenfors and Makinson [5] we find the following important 
results: If I satisfies (El)-(E6) then C( 5) satisfies (Cl)-(CS); if 
- satisfies (Cl)-(CS) then E(A) satisfies (El)-(E6); and finally, 
E(C(<)) = _( for any < satisfying (El)-(E6), and C(E(-t-)) = 2 
for any 2 satisfying (Cl)-(Cg). Thus we get a kind of representation 
theorem similar to the first one: Any contraction function - over K 
satisfying (Cl)-(CS) is an EECF. 
To sum up, we find ourselves faced with Scheme 1. 
In my view, it is more natural to have a relation I on L than 
a relation < on 2L. On the other hand, the rationale behind 
(T)RPMCFs is easier to understand than that behind EECFs. So 
both kinds of contraction constructions have their intuitive merits. 
It seems very desirable to know something about the relationship 
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between (T)RPMCFs and EECFs. This is what we shall be concerned 
with in the main part of this paper. 
3. CONNECTING TIIE TWO ORDERIh-GS: 
GARDENFORS’ I:IRST ATTEMPT 
The first attempt to connect P-relations and EE-relations is due to 
Ggrdenfors [3]. In this paper. however, Gtirdcnfors uses a different set 
of postulates for epistemic entrenchment. It does not include the 
limiting case conditions (E5) and (E6), and instead of (E4) it includes 
an apparent dual, viz., 
@4*) A v B I A or ii v B I B (disjunctivencss). 
There is also another postulate for the preference relation < (which 
has already been discussed in [2]): 
m A4 < M’ or A4’ < M (connectivity). 
Glrdenfors [3], pp. 359-360. then builds a two-way bridge between I 
and d . For any given P-relation ,<, an EE-relation I = E( <) is 
associated with < by defining A I B if and only if for all M in 
M(K) such that A E M there is an !M in M(K) such that B E IV’ and 
M < M’. Conversely, for any given EE-relation 5, a P-relation 
d = P( 5) is associated with I by defining A4 < M’ if and only if 
there is an A E A4 such that for all B E M’ it holds that A I B. 
Notice that these definitions look at the sentences that are retained 
in some elements of M(K). Notice also that the second definition 
attaches most importance to the epistcmically least entrenched sen- 
tences in A4 and M’, a fact which might raise some intuitive 
suspicion. 
The formal results of Glrdenfors [3] are impressive. He shows that 
if < satisfies (PI) and (PZ), then E(G) satisfies (El)-(E3) and (E4*). 
If I satisfies (El)-(E3) and (E4*), then P(I) satisfies (PI)-(P2), pro- 
vided that K is a,finite knowledge set, in the sense that Cn partitions 
it into finitely many equivalence classes.4 In the finite case, Ggrdenfors 
shows that P(E($)) and Q are identical relations on M(K), provided 
that < satisfies (Pl) and (P2), and that E(P(<)) and I are identical 
relations on K, provided that I satisfies (El)-(E3) and (E4*). 
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Unfortunately these results are somewhat depreciated by the obser- 
vation that (E4*), when taken together with (El)-(E3), has some 
undesirable consequences. To prove this, I shall call A an ordinary 
sentence if A < T; if T _< A, then A is called an extraordinary sen- 
tence. (Note that A I T by (E3).) 
LEMMA 1. Let I be a relation satisfying (El)-(E3) and (E4*) and 
iet A and B be ordinary sentences. Then the biconditional A ct B is 
extraordinary. 
Proo$ Let I, A and B bc as indicated. WC start by noting that 
k (A v B) v (A t, B). By (E4*) we have (A v B) v (A ++ B) I 
A v B or (A v B) v (A c-) B) I A t* B. The first condition 
cannot hold, however, since by hypothesis A < T I (A v B) v 
(A +-+ B) and B < T I (A v B) v (A tt B), whence (El) would 
license to infer A < A v B and B < A v B, in contradiction with 
(E4*). Thus the second condition must hold, which means that A c, B 
is extraordinary. Cl 
(E4*) is not really “dual” to (F4), but incompatible with it, on pain 
of triviality: 
COROLLARY. Let I he an EE-relation satisfying (El)-(E4) and 
(E4*), and let A and B he ordinary sentences. Then A I B and B I A. 
Proqf. By Lemma 1 and (E3) we know that A v 1 B is extra- 
ordinary. Hence A < A v 1 B. But by (E4) we have A v B I 
(A v B)&(A v TB) I AorA v ill I (A v B)& 
(A v 1 B) I A. Thus A v B I A. But by an entirely analogous 
argument, also A v B I B. On the other hand, (E3) gives us 
AlAv BandBIAv B.Hcnce,by(El),AIBandB(.A. 
q 
Lemma 1 indeed shows that (E4*) is fatal. There are good reasons 
to represent all beliefs concerning particular matters of fact by 
ordinary sentences (compare (E6) above). There are also good reasons 
to keep extraordinary sentences in contractions as long as possible. 
But combining this and Lemma 1 entails that giving up any of our 
factual beliefs must result in giving up all of our factual beliefs, which 
is absurd. 
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It seems to me, then, that we have to reject (E4*). Yet we do not 
have to renounce results of the Gardenfors [3] style. In the next sec- 
tion, I shall suggest different connections between E-relations and 
P-relations and then mimic Gardenfors’ theorems (where the finiteness 
assumption is dispensed with in all but one case). Furthermore, I 
show that EECFs and TRPMCFs are equivalent if the new bridge is 
crossed in either of the two possible ways. 
4. THE REAL CONNECTION 
We begin by extending < to an ordering of arbitrary sets of sentences, 
i.e.. to a relation on 2L. Henceforth we will call d a preference 
relation, or P-relution, with respect to a knowledge set K if and only if 
Q satisfies the following collection of postulates: 
PO) If M(K, A) # @ then there is an M E M(K, A) such 
that N 6 M for all N E M(K, A) (existence) 
(PI) if M < N and N Q M’ then :M < M’ (transitivity) 
W) M 6 N or N d M (connectivity) 
(P3) if M c N then M d N (dominance) 
(P4) M < M n N or N d M n N (intersection) 
(W M < N for all 1% iff LT $ M (minimality) 
W) if K # L, then N 6 M for all consistent N 
iffK c M (maximality) 
As in the case of EE-relations, connectivity is redundant, but we shall 
keep it as a postulate of its own in order to see its power. In contrast 
to EE-relations (see (E3)): P-relations seem to allow some kind of 
informational-content reading if we look only at (P3). However, (P4) 
shows that one must be cautious with interpretations. I do not want 
to discuss the intuitive content of (PO)-(P6) here. In any case, these 
postulates will turn out to be suitable, when we follow a new road 
from < to I and vice versa. 
DEFINTION 4. If ,< is a P-relation on 2’- (with respect to a knowl- 
edge set K) then the associated EE-relation 5 = E( <) on L (with 
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respect to K) is given by 
A < B if and only if for all M in M(K) such that 
B $ A4 there is an M’ in M(K) such that 
A 4 M’ and M ,< M’. 
We recall from [2], Lemma 2.4, that for any A E K and M E M(K), 
A $ M is equivalent to M E M(K, A). 
DEFINITION 5. If I is an EE-relation on L (with respect to a 
knowledge set K) then the associated P-relation < = P(I) on 2’. 
(with respect to K) is given by 
M 6 N if and only if for all A $ N there is a B 4 M 
such that A I B. 
Notice that these definitions put special attention to the sentences that 
are missing in some set of sentences, and that Definition 5 attaches 
most importance to the epistemically must entrenched sentences miss- 
ing. I believe that these features are intuitively more appealing than 
those of the Gardenforsian definitions mentioned in Section 3. 
Definitions 4 and 5 are formulated in close analogy to the Girden- 
fors definitions. We arc now going to state some useful equivalent 
formulations in two technical lemmas. 
LEMMA 2. Let < he a P-relation on 2’. with respect to a knowledge 
set of K. Then the fallowing three conditions are equivakent: 
(i) For ail M in M(K) such that B # M there is an M’ in M(K) 
such thut A C# M’ and M < M’; 
(ii) far all knowledge sets M such that B 4 M there is u knowledge 
set N such that A 4 N and M < N; 
(iii) for all M E 2L such that M If B there is an N E 2L such that 
N # A and M < N. 
Proof. From (i) to (ii): Let M be a knowledge such that B # M. By 
(P4), (P6) and (PI), we get M Q M n K. Since M A K is again a 
knowledge set and B 4 M n K, there is an M’ in M(K, B) such that 
M n K s M’, the latter giving us M n K < M’, by (P3). By appli- 
cation of(i) WC get that there is an M” in M(K) such that A $ M” 
COKSTRLCTING CONTRACTIONS AND REVISIONS 159 
and M d M”. Since elements of M(K) are knowledge sets and since 
A4 Q M n K < M’ < M”, we find that, by (PI). M” is an N we are 
looking for in (ii). 
From (ii) to (iii): Let M E 2L be such that M V B. Let M’ = 
Cn(M) is a knowledge set, B F$ M’ and, by (P3). M d M’. By appli- 
cation of (ii) WC get that there is a knowledge set N such that A 4 N 
and M’ < N. Since knowledge sets are closed under Cn, N Y A: and 
we find that, by (Pl). N is just such an N as we arc looking for in 
(iii). 
From (iii) to (i): Let M in M(K) bc such that B $ M. Since ele- 
ments of M(K) arc knowledge sets, M V B. By application of (iii) 
we get that there is an N E 2L such that N tf A and M < N. Set 
N’ = Cn(N); then A $ N’ and, by (P3), .N < N’. By (P4), (P6) and 
(Pl), we get N’ Q IV’ n K. Since N’ n K is a knowledge set and 
A $ N’ n K$ there is an M’ in M(K, A) such that N’ n K G M’, the 
latter giving us N’ n K Q M’, by (P3). By M d N d N’ < N’ n 
K < M’ and (Pl). we find that M’ is just such as M’ as we are look- 
ing for in (i). cl 
It will be convenient to have an additional technical concept in the 
following. If I is an EE-relation on L, then an EE-cut, or simply cul, 
is a set of sentences S such that for any A in S all sentences B with 
A I B are also in S.’ We note some properties of cuts. It is easy to 
verify that the class of all cuts is closed under arbitrary unions and 
intersections, that cuts arc nested (by (E2)), and that S.,, defined by 
{B: A < B}, and S;, , defined as {B: A I B}. are cuts by (El)). The 
largest cut is L = {R: I I B], then comes K = (B: I < B) (if 
K # L), then come subsets of K, the smallest but one cut is LT = 
{B: T I B) and the smallest cut is @ = (B: T < B) (by (Ej), (E3) 
and (E6)). Any non-empty cut S is a knowledge set, provided that Cn 
is compact. To see this, assume rhat S : A. Then B, & . . . & B, k A 
for some B,, _ . . , B,: in S, hence, by (E3), B, & . . & B!, 5 A. 
Itcratcd application of (E4) gives us B, I BI & . . . & B, for some 
iE{l,..., iz}, hence, by (El), Bi I A. But as Bi E S and S is a cut, 
this entails that A E S, and we arc done. 
We are now able to recast the defining condition of Definition 5. 
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LEMMA 3. Let I be an EE-relation on L. Then the following two 
conditions are equivalent : 
(i) For all A $ N there is a 3 4 M such that A I B. 
(ii) For all cuts S, ifs c M then S G N. 
Proof. From (i) to (ii): (i) is equivalent to the condition that S, = 
(B: A 5 B} $ M f or all A 4 N. By contraposition, if S, s M then 
A E N. Let S be a cut such that S G M. We have to show that 
S c N. But for any A in S, S,, E S E M, hence A E N, so S c N. 
From (ii) to (i): (ii) entails that for all A, if S, E M, then S, c N. 
Hence, by contraposition and by the reflexivity of I, S, $C M for all 
A 4 N. But this just means that there is a B such that A I B and 
B $ M, for all A $ N, and we are done. cl 
Notice that the proof of Lemma 3 makes use only of the transi- 
tivity and connectivity of I. In the following we shall frequently 
work with the nicer conditions (iii) of Lemma 2 and (ii) of Lemma 3 
in lieu of the characterizations of E( <) and P(I) given in Definitions 
4 and 5. We are now going to explore the interrelation between EE- 
relations and P-relations. 
LEMMA 4. L& < be a P-relation on 2L (with respect to a knowledge 
set K). Then I = E( <) sutisjes (EZ)-(E6). 
Proof. (El) is easy and (E2) follows from (El), (E3) and (E4). - 
For (E3), suppose that A I- B and M V B. In order to get A 5 B, we 
have to show that there is an N such that N It A and M d N. But 
M If A, and by the reflexivity of d (which in turn follows from (P2)), 
M < M, so we can put N = M. - For (E4), suppose for reductio ad 
absurdum that neither A s A & B nor B I A & B. This means that 
there is an M such that M bF A & B and for all N such that N If A it 
holds that not M d N, and there also is an M’ such that M‘ tF A & B 
and for all N’ such that N’ tf B it holds that not M’ < N’. Since Q 
is reflexive, M I- A and M’ t- B. Hence M Y B and M’ If A. Hence 
neither M < M’ nor M’ < M, contradicting (P2). - For (ES), let 
K # L. Assume that A I B for all B. This means that for any B and 
any M such that M tf B there is an N such that N ti A and M < N, 
which is equivalent to the statement that there is an N such that N Y A 
and M d N for all consistent M. By (P6) this in turn means that 
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there is an :V such that N V A and K E X, which reduces to K if A 
or: as K is a knowledge set, to A 4 K. - For (E6), assume that E I A 
for all B. This means that for any B and any M such that M V A 
there is an 1%’ such that ?V V B and M < IV. But if we take T as B, it 
is impossible that !V t! B. Thus it is impossible that M t: A for any M, 
thus t A. 17 
Note that the proof of Lemma 4 does not use (PO), (P3), (P4) or 
(P5). 
LEMMA 5. Let I be an EE-relation on L (with respect to u knowi- 
edge set K). Then < = P(I) sutisfies (PO)-(P6). 
Proof. For (PO), assume that :M(K, A) # 0. Then t: A. We have to 
show that there is an M E M(K, A) such that for all M’ E M(K, A), 
M’ < M, the latter meaning that every cut S G M’ is a subset of M. 
We first note that the largest cut that can be a subset of any element 
of M(K, A) is S, = {S: A < B}, since every larger cut includes A 
(by the reflexivity of 5). Second, .y, # 0. by (E5). A third obser- 
vation is that the non-empty cut S’, is a knowledge set which does not 
contain A. hence S,, h! A. But now we see that M(K, A) must contain 
a superset M of S,,. Clearly for any M’ E M(K, A) and any cut S, if 
S c M’ then S 5 S, E M, and we are done. - (Pl) is immediate, 
and (P2) follows from (PI), (P3) and (P4). - For (P3), assume that 
M 5 N. For M < IV, we have to verify that every cut S c M is a 
subset of X, which is trivial. - For (P4). suppose for reductio ud 
ubsurdum M $ M A N and 1’~’ $ M n N. This means that there is 
a cut S such that S G M and S $ M n N and a cut S’ such that 
S’ c N and S’ $Z M n N. From S c M and S’ G IV we get 
S n S’ c_ M r\ N. But since cuts arc nested, S n S’ = S or 
S n S’ = S’, and we get a contradiction. - For (P5), assume that 
CM d N for all N. This means that for any N E 2’. and any cut S, if 
S E M then S c IV, or equivalently, that for any cut S, if S E $1 
then S = 0. Since LT is the second smallest cut (which is due to 
(E6)). the latter is equivalent to A C$ M for some A such that t A. - 
For (P6), let K # L. Assume that 11’ d M for cvcry consistent N. 
This means that for every consistent N and every cut S, if S c IV 
then S c M, or equivalently, since K # L is the second largest cut 
(which is due to (ES)), K G $2. cl 
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Note that the proof of Lemma 5 requires all of the postulates (El)- 
(E6), which already enter into our knowledge of cuts. 
THEOREM 1. Let <_ be an EE-relation on L (with respect to a 
knowledge set K). Then I * = E(P( I)) is identical with 1. 
Proof. We have to show that A <* 3 if and only if A I B. 
From left to right: Let A I* B, which means that for all M such 
that M Y B there is an N such that N tt A and for all cuts S, if 
S c M then S G N. Suppose for reductio that B < A, i.e., that 
A E S,. Since S, is a knowledge set not containing B, S, V B. Thus 
there must be an N such that N ti A and S, s N. But since A E S,, 
N contains A, so N t A, and we have a contradiction. 
From right to left: Let B <* A, which means that there is an M 
such that M P 1y and for all N such that N If A there is a cut S such 
that S G M and S $ N. Suppose for reductio that A i B, i.e., that 
A $ S,. Since S, is a knowledge set, S, Y A. Thus there must be an M 
such that M V B and a cut S such that S c M and S 9 S,. From 
the latter condition it follows that there is a C in S such that C I tl, 
and since S is a cut, B must be in S too. But as S G M, then B E M, 
so M t B, and we have a contradiction. Cl 
THEOREM 2. Let 6 be a P-relation on 2’ with respect to afinite 
knowledge set K. Then the restrictions of <* = P(E( <)) and < to the 
cluss of‘knowledge sets are identical. 
ProoJ Let K be a finite knowledge set. We have to show that for 
any two knowledge sets M and N, M <* N iff M < N. Let N and M 
always stand for knowledge sets in this proof. The cut notation is not 
useful here, so we apply the original condition of Definition 5. 
From left to right: Let M <* N, which means that for all A 4 N 
there is a B 4 M such that for all M’ with M’ If B there is an N’ such 
that N’ !I A and M’ < N’. As M is a knowledge set, we can put 
M’ = M, getting that for all A 4 N there is an N’ such that N’ If A 
and M < N’. In particular, for all A E K - N there is an N’ such 
that N’ I/ A and M d N’. Since K is finite module Cn, we will need 
only finitely many such sets N’. Call them N,‘, . . . , N,,‘. Since N’ V A 
entails A 4 N’, we have (N,’ n . . . n NJ n K s N n K, hence 
(N,’ n . . . n N,,‘) n K < N n K. On the other hand, by (n- I)-fold 
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application of (P4), &’ d IV; n . . . n A{; for some i E { 1, . _ . . n>. 
Furthermore, (P4), (P6) and (PI) give us N; n . . . n Xi d (IV,’ n . . . n 
NJ n K. Putting all this together, we finally get the chain M < Ni’ < 
;-l)y,, ,ryi;ya;Ir; iT. . . n N,,‘) n K B N n K Q N, and. by 
From right to left: Let N <* M, which means that there is an 
A # N such that for all B I$ M there is an IM’ with JM’ Y B such that 
for all N’ with :V’ H A, N’ < 1M’. As N is a knowledge set, we can 
put N’ = IV, getting that for all B 6 A4 there is an M’ such that 
M’ V B and N < M’. By a chain of reasoning entirely analogous to 
the from-left-to-right case, we get N < 1M. 0 
The last four results reproduce those of Gardenfors [3] in our new 
setting. The main differences are these: first, I USC more complete sets 
of conditions for < and 6; second, I consider I as a relation not 
only on K but on I. and < as a relation not only on M(K) but on 
2’-; third, I need the finiteness assumption for K only once where 
Gardenfors uses it three times. The most interesting observations 
of this paper are, 1 believe, the following theorems for which there 
are no precedents in [3]. Roughly, they say that partial meet contrac- 
tions based on d and cpistemic entrenchment contractions based on 
< are equivalent, if Q and I are related by either Definition 4 or 
Defnition 5. 
THEOREM 3. Let < he a P-relution on 2’. (with respect to a knowl- 
edge set K). Then C(E( <)) is identical with C( <). 
Pruqf. If we write --_ for C(E( <)) and -* for C( <). we have to 
show that K - A = K A-* A for any A E L. This is trivial in the 
limiting case of A E LT where by delinition K 1 A = K = K --L* A. 
Now let A 4 LT. 
Condition (iii) of Lemma 2 is not useful here, so we go back to the 
original condition of Definition 4. For K A A = K -* A then we 
have to show that 
(*I K n {B: there is an ,W’ in M(K) such that A $ M’ and 
for all M in M(K) such that A v B 4 M it holds 
that M < M’} = 
n {ME M(K, A): M’ < M for all M’ in M(K, A)). 
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Consider the case where A is not in K. Then M(K, A) = {K}, so 
the RHS of (*) is K. It remains to show that for all B E K there is 
an M’ in M(K) such that A $ M’ and for all M in M(K) such that 
A v B $ M it holds that M < M’. Let B E K and choose K as M’. 
It suffices to show that for all M in M(K) such that A v B 4 M we 
have M < K. But if A v B 4 M then K is not a subset of M, since 
A v B E K. So, by (P6), M < K. 
Now consider the principal case A E K. We first note that for all M 
inM(K)andallAandBinK,A v B$MiffA$MandB$M. 
For suppose that M E M(K, C); then A v B E K - M iff M u 
{A v B} t C, i.e., M u (A) I- C and M u {B} t C, i.e., A E K - M 
and B E K - M. 
Using this we know that B is in the LHS of (*) if and only if 
(**I B E K and there is an M’ in M(K) such that A $ M’ 
and for all M in M(K) such that A $ M and B 4 M it 
holds that M < M’. 
From (**) we get by simple predicate calculus 
(***I for all M in M(K) such that A 4 M and B $ M there is 
an M’ in M(K) such that A $ M’ and M < M’. 
To see that conversely (***) already entails (**), first suppose for 
reductio that (***) holds but B $ K. Then B $ M for all M in M(K). 
By Lemma 2.4 of [2], (***) then states that for all M E M(K, A) there 
is an M’ E M(K, A) such that M < M’. But this contradicts (PO). 
Thus B E K. Second, suppose for reductio that (***) holds but also 
that for all M’ in M(K) such that A 4 M’ there is an M in M(K) 
such that A $ M and B $ M and M’ < M. By (PI) and Lemma 2.4 
of [2], then we get that for all M’ E M(K, A) there is an M” E M(K, A) 
such that M’ < M”. But this again contradicts (PO). Thus (**). 
Now we know that B is in the LHS of (*) iff (***) is satisfied. (***) 
is logically equivalent to B E r){M E M(K): A 4 M and M’ < M for 
all M’ E M(K) such that A E M’}. Using Lemma 2.4 of [2] again, we 
see that this may be expressed as B E n(M E M(K, A): M’ < M for 
all M’ E M(K, A)}, which is just the RHS of (*). 0 
Using previously established results, we obtain the next central 
theorem as a corollary of Theorem 3. 
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. . /’ 
EE-RELATidN’on L E 
r 
j P-RE&flON on 2k’ 
:: K finite. 4 restricted ’ 
I satisfying (El )-(k6) < to knM sets 5 :c satisfying (PO)-(P6). 
CONTRACTION FUNCTION 
.L&- 
2 satisfying (Cl)-(C8) 
Scheme 2 
THEOREM 4. Let I be an EE-relation on L (with respect to knowl- 
edge set K). Then C(P( -<)) is identical with C(I). 
Proof. From Lemma 5 we know that P(I) is a P-relation with 
respect to K. Hence, by Theorem 3, C(P( I)) = C(E(P( I))). 
Theorem I te!ls us that E(P(<)) = <, hence C(E(P(<))) = C( 2). 
Putting this together, we get C(P( I)) = C(I). 0 
Taking over the connection between EE-relations and (EE-)contrac- 
tion functions from 151: we are now presented Scheme 2. 
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The missing links between preference relations and contraction func- 
tions are supplied easily by a last connecting definition. 
DEFINITION 6. If A is a contraction function over K then the 
associated preference relation d = P(l) on 2L is given by P(E(-)). 
P( -) of course satisfies (PO)-(P6). We can establish a number of 
corrollaries in a way similar to the proof of Theorem 4. 
COROLLARIES. Let 2 he a contraction function over a knowledge 
set K, I an EE-relation and < he a P-relation with respect to K. Then 
the following identities hold: 
G) C(P(L)) = -. 
(ii) P(C( <)) = < within the class of knowledge sets. 
provided that K is finite. 
(iii) P(C(I)) = P(S). 
(4 E(C(<)) = E(d). 
(4 E(P(2)) = E(L). 
A last interesting question is how Definition 6 relates to the construc- 
tion of a preference relation P*( 1) which can be found in Alchourron, 
Girdenfors and Makinson [2], p. 519. Let N(K, A) be the set of all M 
in M(K) such that K A A G M, and N(K) the set of all M in M(K) 
such that K 1 A E M for some A. Note that N(K, A) 5 M(K, A) u 
{K): Let M E N(K, A); then K 2 A c_ M and, without loss of 
generality, M E M(K, B); if B 4 K then M = K and we are done; if 
B E K then, by (C5), A -+ B E K L A c M, hence, since M V B, 
A $ M. So, by Lemma 2.4 of [2], M E M(K, A). 
P*(l) is deGned on 2K; if we abbreviate it by Q* it can be intro- 
duced as follows: M <* M’ if and only if M E M(K), M’ E N(K) 
and for all A, if M E N(K, A) and M’ E M(K, A) then M’ E N(K, A). 
Since both C(P*( A)) = -I (see [2]) and C(P(2)) = A (corollary 
(i) above), one may expect that P*(l) and P(A) show some agree- 
ment. Obviously it is only interesting to compare the restrictions of 
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P*(L) and P(A) to M(K). I could not prove: nor do I think it is 
true that in general P*( -) and P(-) are identical within the whole 
range of M(K). However, we can get the following result: 
THEOREM 5. Let 2 he a contraction function over a knolc+edge set 
K. If < = P(z) and 6* = P*(A), then A4 6 M’ if3^M 6* M’,for 
ali M in X(K) - {K) and M’ in N(K). 
Sketch ofproof. Let M E N(K) - {K] and M’ E N(K). We have 
to show that 
(*I for all A 4 M’ there is a B 4 M such that A $ K I A & B 
if and only if 
(**) for all C, if M E M(K, C) and M’ E M(K, C) 
then M’ E N(K, C). 
If M’ = K, then (*) is true, since A 4 K 2 A & B for all A $ K and 
arbitrary B: and (**) is true as well, since K E M(K, C) implies that 
M(K, C) = {Kj. Let us now turn to the principal case M’ # K. 
To set that (*) implies (**). suppose for rcductio that (*) holds but 
not (**), the latter meaning that M E N(K, C), M’ E M(K. C) and 
M’ 4 N(IY, C) for some C, As K A C $L M’, we can choose a D 
such that D E K I C and D $ M’. Since C, D E K, C. D # M’ and 
M’ E M(K). we get, by an argument already used in the proof of 
Theorem 3, C v D 6 M’. By (*), there is a B # M such that C v D 4 
K - (C v D) & B. Next we show that B # K - B & C: by (C4), 
B $ K z B & C or C 4 K - B & C; in the first case we are done and 
in the second case (C8) gives us K - B & C c K - C, and since 
K - C c A4 and B 4 M, we get B $ K - B & C. From C v D $ 
K - (C v D) & B and B 4 K 2 B & C. WC conclude with the help 
of a transitivity argument taken from [5]. p. 94. that C v D $ K 2 
(C v D) & C. This means, by (C6), C v D 4 K 1 C. But as we 
assumed D E K A C, we have a contradiction with (Cl). 
Conversely, to set that (**) implies (*), suppose for reductio that 
(**) holds, but not (*). The latter means that there is an A q! M’ such 
that A E K 1 A & B for all B $ M. Choose such an A. Without loss 
of generality, let M E N(K) - {K 1 be in N(K, E). Hence M E M(K, E), 
so E 4 M, hence A E K 2 A & E. By (C 1) and (C4), then, E $ K A 
A & E, hence, by (C8), K - A & E c K 2 E. Since K 2 E G M, 
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also K 2 A & E G M. But as A 4 M’, also A & E 4 M’, hence by 
Lemma 2.4 of [2] M’ E M(K, A & E). Thus (**) gives us K L A & 
EEM’.B~~AEK- A&EandA$M’,soKA A&E$M’, 
and we have a contradiction. 0 
For finite knowledge sets the agreement between P*(A) and P( 2) is 
almost perfect: 
COROLLARY. Let L he u contraction/unction over afinite knowledge 
set K. If < = P(A) und <* = P*(A) then M d M’ 18M <* M’ 
for all M in M(K) - {K} and M’ in M(K). 
Proof. In view of Theorem 5 it suffices to show that M(K) c N(K) 
for finite K. Let M E M(K). We have to show that K - A E M for 
some A. Since K is finite, K - M, too, is partitioned into finitely many 
equivalence classes by Cn. Let A bc the disjunction A, v . . . v A, 
of representatives of these equivalence classes. We show that in fact 
K - A E M. Let B E K A A. By (C4) and (Cl), B V A. So, by con- 
struction of A, B 4 K - M. But as B E K by (C2), we get B E M. (It 
is possible to show that even K 1 A = M.) 0 
5. REMARKS ON SIMPLE REVISIONS 
At the end of Section 2 we noted that it is easier to conceive EE- 
relations on L then P-relations on 2L, but that EE-contraction func- 
tions are not very perspicuous. In many contexts, however, one is 
interested in contraction functions only as a means of obtaining 
revisions. We base the following considerations on the advice of the 
Levi identity which tells us that a revision function + = R(A) over a 
knowledge set K is to be constructed from a contraction function - 
over K by putting K -& A = Cn((K 2 1 A) u {A}) for all sentences 
A. In the case of an EE-contraction function 1, then, it is possible to 
specify a very simple “withdrawal function” \ over K (the term is due 
to Makinson [S]) which is revision-equivalent over K in the sense that 
R(\) = R(L). We make use of EE-cuts which have been helpful in 
simplifying some proofs of the last section. 
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DEFINITION 7. If 5 is an EE-relation on L, then the associated 
withdrawal function \, = W(I) over K is given by 
K\,A = 
i 
S, = (B: A < B}, if YA, 
K, if IA. 
It is easy to see that ‘I~, has nearly all the properties of a contraction 
function: 
LEMMA 6. Let 5 be an EE-relation on L (with respect to a knowl- 
edge set K). Then ‘t,, = W(I) satisfies (Cl)-(C4) and (C6)-(Cl?). but 
not ((3). 
Proof: For FA we have K(,A = K, and it is easy to verify (Cl)- 
(C8). So let VA. Then, by (E6) and (E2), S,, # a. We saw in Section 
4 that non-empty cuts are knowledge sets, so (Cl) is satisfied. (C2) 
and (C3) follow from (E5). (C4) follows from the reflexivity of < 
(which in turn is due to (E2)). (C6) follows from (E3). For (C7). 
assume that C E K\ A n Kit< B, i.e., A < C and B < C. By (E3), 
A & B I A, hence, by (El), A & B < C, so C E K: A & B. (Note 
that even K’: A u K’t: B E K\,A & B and that K\ A & B = K’<\, A 
or K\ A & B = K’l,, B.) For (C8), assume that A 4 K\ A & B and 
C E K’,,A & B, i.e., A < A & B and A & B < C. Thus, by (El), 
A -c C, hence CE K/A. 
We give a counterexample to (C5). Let A, B E L such that tiA and 
A V B. WC consider K = Cn({A: B}) and define 5 on L by putting 
T 5 C 5 T for C E LT, I I C I I for C 4 K. I < C < T for 
C E K - LT, C I D and D I C for C, D E K - LT, and then 
taking the transitive closure. It is easy to check that this generates an 
EE-relation on L. We find that Cn((K\, A) u (A}) = Cn({ C: A < C 1 u 
{A)) = Cn(LT u {A)) = Cn((A]). Since by assumption K = 
Cn({A, B)) and A tf B, then, K is not a subset of Cn((K!,, A) u [A)). 
Given ‘;, = W(I) and - = C(I) for some EE-relation I on L, 
it is clear that K\ A E K 2 A: if A < B then B E K by (E5) and 
A < A v B by (E3) and (El). But K\ A gives up too many sentences 
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(see the counterexample to (C5) just given). The violation of the 
recovery postulate (C5) is a violation of the idea of minimal loss of 
information (see [8] for a thorough discussion of recovery). It is 
interesting to observe, however, that \ is revision-equivalent to -: 
LEMMA 7. Let I he an EE-relation on L. Then R( W( -<)) = 
R(C( g 1). 
Proof. We have to show that Cn(.S,, u (1 A)) = Cn((K n {B: A < 
A v B)) u (1 A}). We already know that S, 5 K A (B: A < 
A v B}), so it remains to show that RHS c LHS. Suppose that 
C E RHS, i.e., that there arc B,, . . . , B,, such that Bi E K and 
A <A v B,foralli= I,..., nandB ,,..., B,,,iAtC(iA 
may be redundant). Then obviously A v B,, . . . , A v B,, A v 
1 A 1 A v C. Since we may drop the premise A v 1 A and since 
A v B,ESAforalli= I,..., n, WC find that A v C E Cn(S,), so 
C E Cn(S, u {i A}). 0 
The upshot of Lemma 7 is that it is very easy to perform EE-revisions, 
i.e., revisions obtained from IX-contractions via the Levi identity. 
In order to go to K $ A, jwst keep all those sentences of K that are 
epistemically better entrenched than 1 A, add A and take the deductive 
closure. There is no trouble with intricate comparisons of disjunctions 
as in Definition 2. This appears to be a very perspicuous and manag- 
able method of constructing revisions of knowledge bases. 
6. REMARKS ON ITERATED REVISIONS 
So far WC have investigated transitions from some knowledge set K 
to a revised knowledge set K + A. On closer inspection, however, it 
comes out that we started out from K together with an EE-relation < 
with respect to K but ended up with a bare set of sentences. There is 
no guidance at all what to do if we were to revise K 4 A in a second 
step. WC need an IX-relation <A with respect to K + A to accom- 
plish iterated revisions. To put it differently. it is not knowledge sets 
that have to be revised but EE-relations.” We can indeed get some- 
thing like revisions of EE-relations in the Gardenfors model, but they 
are not perfect. I believe the most suitable suggestion is this: 
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DEFINITION 8. Let < be an EE-relation on L (with respect to a 
knowledge of set K). Then the revision <,i of 5 is given by 
B I,, C if and only if A + B 5 A + C. 
To form an idea of how this definition works, we note the following 
properties of IA : 
LEMMA 8. Let I be an EE-r-elation on L (with respect to knowledge 
set K). 
(i) Then sA satisfies (El)-(H). 
(ii) Let i 1 A. Then IA and K + A satisfi (E5) if‘ and only f 
K + A = K -j-* A where +* = R(C(<)). 
(iii) Let VA. Theta I~,, does not satisfy (E6). 
ProqJ: (i) It is straightforward to show that <.A inherits (El)-(E4) 
from the corresponding postulates for I. 
(ii) Let s,~ and K + A satisfy (E5). That is, 
(“1 C cA B for some C if and only if t3 E K j- A. 
By Definition 8, the LHS of (*) means that A + C < A + B for 
some C which, by (E3), is equivalent to 1 A < A + B, or A ---f 
B E S..,,4. We recall from Section 4 that the asumption VT A implies 
that S,,j # 0 is a theory. So A -+ B E S,, is equivalent to B E 
Cn(-L u {Al). Comparing this with the RHS of (*), we can 
transform the postulate (ES) for I,,, and K + A into K + A = 
Cn(S.,, u (A}). By Lemma 7, this means that K + A = K +* A 
where -j-* = R(C(<)), and WC are done. 
(iii) By (E3), A 4 B I A -+ A for all B, hence B srl A for all B, 
despite the assumption that VA. So I,, violates (E6). cl 
The only point that does not fit into the nice picture is mentioned 
in part (iii). On the one hand, I do not think that the violation of 
maximality is very annoying. (E6) is a limiting case postulate which 
could be dropped if some suitable technical changes were made at 
other places in the revision model. If there are contingent A’s such 
that A 5 I (the A’s outside K), why shouldn’t there be contingent 
A’s such that T d A? Candidates for sentences pretending to maximal 
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epistemic entrenchment are ‘Bachelors are unmarried’, ‘Penguins are 
birds’, or ‘F = m * a’ for an advocate of Newtonian mechanics. 
On the other hand, the way how Definition 8 invalidates maximality 
is dissatisfying. Evidently, A is a greatest element under I”, by 
t A --, A and (E3). So A is put on the same level as the theorems 
of the logic Cn in K j- A. Worse, A cannot lose this extraordinary 
status through later revisions, which is again due to Definition 8. For 
instance, we cannot make plausible statements about (K + A) + 1 A. 
Because A is extraordinary in K + A, the EE-revision (K -j- A) + 
in is Cn((B: A cA B) u (iA}) = Cn(iA), while intuitively we 
rather expect (K + A) -/- 1 A = K j- 1 A if tfi A. Difficulties like 
this arc, I believe, not to be ascribed in some awkwardness of Defini- 
tion 8, but to the fundamental limitations of the purely relational EE- 
revision model. Corresponding difficulties are known in probability 
theory, where standard conditionalization gives PA(A) = 1, and no 
later conditionalization of P,, will push the probability of A down any 
more. A well-known solution of this problem is to employ the Jeffrey 
conditionalization PA,o: = aPA + (I - a)P,, for some certainty factor 
a between 0 and 1. It seems that in order to tackle the analogous 
problem for non-probabilistic revisions the purely relational structure 
of knowledge bases must be enriched to an ordinal one. This task 
is accomplished by Spohn’s [9, lo] theory of ordinal conditional 
functions.’ 
NOTES 
’ Isaac Levi made me realize that there arc contexts where the recovery postulate (CS) 
is problematic. In such contexts the constructions to bc discussed do not seem appro- 
priate. Compare [g]. 
2 In [3] and [4], M(K) is dehncd as lJ { M(K, A): A E K and t/A}, and in [2] as 
U{M(K, A): A E K}. 
3 In many contexts (PO) is not really essential By defining K A A as tJ {n {M’ E M(K, A): 
M’ > M): M E M(K, A)} one could dispense with (PO) and nevertheless get most of 
the things desired. I shall keep (PO), though, partly for the sake of simplicity and partly 
bccausc I need it in the proof of my central Theorem 3. 
’ (E4’) is not needed for the proof of this result. It is also remarkable that (PO) is not 
even mentioned in Gardcnfors [3]. 
’ The concept of an EEcut is inspired by, but not identical with the concept of a cut 
in Grove 161, p. 165. 
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’ The concept of a knowledge set is. in a sense, superth~ous. One could take EE- 
relations on L as primitive and define associated knowledge sets K # L by K = S, 
Similarly, taking P-relations < on ZL or contraction functions z from L to 2’. as pri- 
mitive, one could get knowledge sets K # L by putting K = n(M E ZL: L & M ) and 
K = ~(1) rcspcctively. 
r I want to thank Isaac Levi and David Makinson for a number of helpful comments. 
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